News:

The article The Anticompetitive Effects of Minority Share Acquisitions: Evidence from the Introduction of National Leniency Programs  (with Kai Hüschelrath, Ulrich Laitenberger and Yossi Spiegel) has been nominated for the Antitrust Writing Awards 2023 in the category "Economics".

Feel free to vote for it  :)

Antitrust Writing Awards 2023 

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The paper Incumbency Advantages: Price Dispersion, Price Discrimination and Consumer Search at Online Platforms, (with Klaus Gugler, Maarten Janssen and Mario Liebensteiner) has now been accepted for publication in the Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics.

Abstract

When lower prices are only available to consumers who search, firms can price discriminate based on search. We study local German electricity retail markets where non-searching consumers pay the incumbent's baseline tariff. To observe other prices, consumers access an online platform. Pricing and search patterns differ substantially across local markets. Using panel data, we show that in local markets with more search, incumbents have higher baseline tariffs, while incumbent's and entrants' online tariffs are lower. In a theoretical model, we discuss when an incumbent has an incentive to differentiate tariffs and the welfare properties of banning such price discrimination practices.

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My research on The Anticompetitive Effects of Minority Share Acquisitions: Evidence from the Introduction of National Leniency Programs  (with Kai Hüschelrath, Ulrich Laitenberger and Yossi Spiegel) has just been published in the American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Vol.14 No.1, February 2022 (p.366-410).

Abstract

We address the growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may lessen competition, using the introduction of national leniency programs (LPs) as a shock that destabilizes collusive agreements. Based on data from 63 countries, we find a large and significant immediate increase in domestic horizontal MS acquisitions once an LP is introduced but only in countries where the LP is deemed to be effective. There is no effect on non-horizontal or cross-border MS acquisitions. Our findings suggest that firms may use MS acquisitions to either stabilize collusive agreements or soften competition in the event that collusion breaks down. 

An interview on the topic can be found here .

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A recent working paper on the effect of night curfews  in Germany can be downloaded here:

Measuring the effects of COVID-19-related night curfews: Empirical evidence from Germany, with Sammy de Haas and Georg Götz (press coverage: FAZ, N-TV , RTL, SWR, BILD, ARD, Frankfurter Rundschau,  L'Express, CNEWS, Sydney Morning Herald,  The Age , ARD(TV), Welt  (TV), SAT 1 (TV))

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The book "Ex-post Economic Evaluation of Competition Policy: The EU Experience", Edited by the European Commission, Wolters Kluwer, Brussels, 311-344, 2020, has been published. It covers several chapters dealing with the ex post evaluation of individual merger interventions, antitrust decisions and State aid cases as well as the broader, macroeconomic impact of EU competition policy. Among those one by Kai Hüschelrath, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, Maurizio Strazzeri and me.